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We	must	rethink	Russia’s	propaganda	machine	in
order	to	reset	the	dynamic	that	drives	it
To	understand	how	Russian	propaganda	works,	we	first	have	to	discard	the	idea	that	the	Kremlin	is
in	charge	of	a	coordinated	media	machine	acting	together	with	cyber-warriors	to	attack	a	single
audience.	Stephen	Hutchings	explains	why	Russian	media	discourses	are	much	more
complicated	than	often	presented.
The	theme	of	propaganda	dominated	much	British	media	coverage	of	the	Skripal	spy	poisoning
scandal.	Among	motivations	for	the	poisoning	offered	by	journalists	of	all	persuasions	were	that	it
was	itself	an	example	of	state	propaganda	–	a	public	‘warning’	to	other	dissidents;	and	that	it	was	intended	to
provoke	Britain	into	a	new	bout	of	‘Russophobia’,	to	which	Putin’s	firm	response	would	burnish	his	strong	man	image
in	Russia’s	state	media	days	before	the	presidential	election.
Inevitably,	Russia’s	international	broadcaster,	RT,	became	embroiled	in	the	affair	when	OFCOM	announced	an
investigation	into	its	licence.	Several	MPs	called	for	it	to	be	banned	for	its	part	in	a	Kremlin	propaganda	machine
responsible	for	ever	more	inflammatory	assaults	on	western	values	at	home,	and	increasingly	flagrant	efforts	to
disrupt	democracies	abroad.
The	vanishing	‘Gerasimov	Doctrine’
Underpinning	the	dominant	media	account	of	the	Skripal	affair	was	a	simple	set	of	assumptions:	a	single,	lurid
narrative.	It	warns	of	a	paranoid	but	resolute	Kremlin	deploying	a	monstrous	state	security	apparatus,	primed	to
commit	acts	of	aggression	against	anyone	who	opposes	it.	This	apparatus	is	supported	by	compliant	media	acting	in
coordination	with	cyber-warriors,	human	and	non-human	–	a	baneful	army	seemingly	marching	under	the	banner	of
Russia’s	infamous	‘Gerasimov	Doctrine’	of	‘hybrid	warfare’.
Recently,	however,	Mark	Galeotti,	who	coined	the	term	‘Gerasimov	Doctrine’,	issued	a	mea	culpa,	clarifying	that	he
had	invented	it	as	a	convenient	umbrella	for	a	range	of	practices	that,	whilst	serving	similar	goals,	had	never,	in	his
view,	been	deliberately	coordinated.	Our	research	on	the	Russian	media	corroborates	Galeotti’s	position.	But	it	goes
much	further.	It	suggests	that	in	order	to	understand	Russian	propaganda	we	have	to	discard	long-discredited
‘transmission	belt’	or	‘hypodermic	needle’	accounts	of	media	effects	in	which	the	press	‘injects’	the	toxin	of
propaganda,	or	the	antidote	of	truth,	into	the	collective	bloodstream.	Variants	on	Noam	Chomsky’s	and	Edward
Herman’s	later	model	of	propaganda	centring	on	a	subtle	‘manufacturing	of	consent’	are	barely	more	helpful.
‘Subtlety’	and	‘consent’	are	rare	commodities	in	Russia’s	state	media.
Complicating	the	landscape
Our	earlier	work	shows	that	official	Russian	media	discourses	do	not	come	‘ready-made’	for	transmission.	Instead,
they	are	forged	from	a	dynamic	process	of	interaction	between	journalists,	the	Kremlin,	and	diverse	popular	and
intellectual	discourses.	State-aligned	television	channels	are	as	much	actors	within	a	global	communications	network
whose	information	flows	they	both	absorb	and	contribute	to	as	they	are	Putin’s	dedicated	propaganda	storm-
troopers.	Meanwhile,	television	news	narratives	under	Putin	point	to	an	oligarchy	that,	whilst	ruthlessly	determined	to
retain	power,	is	often	split	and	uncertain	how	to	react	to	events.	During	last	year’s	centennial	of	the	1917	Revolution,
the	emergence	of	a	stable	(and	highly	negative)	media	account	of	the	Bolsheviks’	place	in	Russian	history	was
preceded	by	months	of	hesitation	as	different	factions	within	the	elite	(military;	Orthodox	Church;	journalistic)
indulged	their	conflicting	narratives.
Russia’s	state	media	‘operations’	increasingly	outsource	activities,	bringing	problems	characteristic	of	neoliberal
policy.	When	a	digital	activist	was	commissioned	to	produce	‘viral	videos’	celebrating	Putin’s	leadership,	all	was	well
–	until	he	went	‘off	message’	with	clips	adopting	a	distinctly	ambivalent	attitude	to	the	Putin	cult.	This	dissonance
correlates	with	theories	of	the	Skripal	murder	that	attribute	it	to	similarly	‘off-mission’	elements	within	Russia’s	vast
security	apparatus.	Leading	Russian	dissident,	Mikhail	Khodorkovsky,	recently	put	to	BBC	Newsnight	the	idea	that
Putin	had	ceded	control	of	this	apparatus	to	criminal	gangs,	wrong-footing	an	interviewer	who	was	following	the
familiar	script	pitting	anti-Putin	dissidents	against	an	all-powerful,	dictatorial	Kremlin.
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Our	work	underscores	the	necessity	to	situate	broadcasters	like	RT	within	a	complex	Russian	media	landscape.	This
landscape	is	stalked	by	Putin’s	overbearing	presence.	But	it	includes	space	for	liberal-leaning,	web-based	television
channels	(Dozhd’	TV)	and	radio	stations	(Moscow	Ekho),	and	for	the	newspaper,	Novaya	Gazeta,	which	consistently
stands	alone	against	Kremlin	orthodoxies.	These	are	more	than	‘safe	vaccines’	intended	to	inoculate	the	Kremlin
against	dangers	posed	by	western	liberalism	in	its	virulent,	contagious	form.	Novaya	Gazeta	articles	are	regularly
retweeted	by	RT	journalists	whose	online	profiles	are	more	rounded	than	the	ideologically	correct	face	they	maintain
in	news	broadcasts.	In	the	online	Russian-speaking	world,	arch	Putin-opponent,	Alexei	Navalny,	co-exists	with
government	trolls,	and	the	full	spectrum	of	political	opinion	is	accessible	at	the	click	of	a	mouse.
Resetting	the	machine
Kremlin	propaganda	has	multiple	targets:	domestic	Russian	audiences,	diaspora	populations	and	international
publics,	all	with	profoundly	different	sensibilities.	More	importantly,	leading	journalists	are	not	passive	state	hacks.
They	are	powerful	actors	who	co-author	state	television	narratives	with	the	Kremlin,	but	with	some	licence	to	stray
from	them,	whether	to	appeal	to	political	fringes,	or	to	indulge	their	own	views.
Most	western	media	critiques	of	‘the	Russian	media’	restrict	themselves	to	state	television	news.	This,	too,	can
mislead.	Talk-shows	feature	a	much	broader	range	of	political	opinions	than	news	programmes,	albeit	within
controlled	parameters.	During	the	presidential	election	campaign,	anti-Putin	candidate,	Ksenia	Sobchak,	bitterly
attacked	Kremlin	corruption	on	talk	shows	in	which	she	was	nonetheless	outnumbered,	and,	in	one	instance,	was
reduced	to	tears.	After	the	election,	the	same	shows	hosted	guests	who	speculated	openly	about	electoral	fraud	–
speculation	that	was	clearly	evidenced	in	a	video	shared	on	the	website	of	RT	France.
The	further	one	moves	from	current	affairs	genres,	the	more	islands	of	audacity	the	seasoned	observer	can	identify
amidst	oceans	of	conformity.	Russia’s	complex	media	ecology	is	a	product	both	of	the	digital	age	and	of	neoliberal
economics.	Journalistic	(and	artistic)	identities	are	forged	across	multiple	outlets,	online	platforms,	and	genres,	within
hyperlinked	global	networks,	shaped	as	much	by	commercial	as	by	political	imperatives.	Deviant	meanings	are
therefore	sometimes	generated	not	at	the	peripheries	of	Russia’s	media	landscape	but	at	its	centre.	In	2017,
Channel	1	hosted	a	glossy,	prime-time	serial	about	American	sleeper	agents.	It	was	mined	for	subversive	meanings
by	Russia’s	liberal	intelligentsia,	familiar	with	the	script-writer’s	progressive	politics.	Having	identified	what	he	was
looking	for,	one	commentator	described	the	series	itself	as	a	kind	of	‘sleeper	agent’.
Why	does	all	this	matter?	It	matters	first	because	misrepresentations	of	the	nature	and	context	of	propaganda
weaken	and	distort	measures	designed	to	confront	it.	But	secondly,	in	a	hyper-networked	world,	reductive
stereotypes	on	both	sides	feed	one	another,	creating	toxic	spirals	of	mutual	hostility.	We	must	rethink	Russia’s
propaganda	machine	in	order	to	reset	the	dynamic	that	drives	it.
___________
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